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The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude 
 
Chon Tejedor 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of religious (or ethical) attitude in 
the Tractatus, one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the 
view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the 
religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to 
the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, 
the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are 
nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by 
Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as 
transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer 
a feature of his position in the Tractatus. In connection to the second, I argue that the 
religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition 
to use signs in a way that demonstrates one’s conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to 
the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot 
be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all. 
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Introduction 
 
In this paper, I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of religious attitude 
in the Tractatus. For Wittgenstein, religiousness is closely intertwined with ethical 
considerations, especially during this period.1 In fact, Wittgenstein’s earlier approach to 
religion cannot be easily extricated from his approach to ethics and the former is most 
effectively explored in connection to the latter. For this reason, I will, in this paper, be 
drawing on remarks from the Notebooks, the Prototractatus, the Tractatus and ‘A 
Lecture on Ethics’ that are sometimes described in the secondary literature as focusing on 
religion and sometimes on ethics.2 I myself will be using the expression ‘religious 
attitude’ to capture Wittgenstein’s notion of an ethically correct or genuinely religious 
attitude.3   
 Part of my aim in this paper is to argue against three views from the secondary 
literature that have, I contend, had a distorting effect on our understanding of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Joachim Schulte notes: ‘for Wittgenstein genuine religiousness is always connected with decisions 
on how to lead a decent life. One might say that his view of religion was a profoundly ethical one’ - 
Schulte, J. ‘On a Remark by Jukundus’, Synthese Library #346: Interactive Wittgenstein: Essays in 
Memory of Georg Henrik Von Wright, E. De Pellegrin (ed.), (Springer, 2011) 183–208, 186. Severin 
Schroeder explains that, even in his later philosophical period, Wittgenstein’s interest was primarily with a 
notion of religion ‘that he personally found appealing: comprehensible, intellectually respectable and 
morally attractive’ - Schroeder, S. ‘The Tightrope Walker’, Ratio 20, 4, (2007) 442–463, 444 
2  References are drawn from: Wittgenstein, L. Notebooks 1914–1916 (NB), eds. G. von Wright and 
G. E. M. Anscombe, transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961); Wittgenstein, L. 
Prototractatus (PTLP), eds. B. F.  McGuinness, T. Nyberg & G. von Wright, transl. B. F. McGuinness & 
D. F. Pears (London: Routledge, 1971); Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), transl. 
D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, (London: Routledge, 1961); Wittgenstein, L. ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ 
(LOE), The Philosophical Review, 74, 1, 3–12 (1965). Although ten years separate the writing of the 
Tractatus and that of ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, Wittgenstein’s approach to religiousness and the ethical 
remains so close in these two texts that they are, in my view, best examined alongside each other. 
3  Here, I favour the expressions ‘religious attitude’ and ‘religiousness’ because I feel they better 
capture Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic understanding of the ethical, which is quite distant from our 
contemporary conceptions of ethics. 
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Wittgenstein’s position on religion in the Tractatus. The views in question can be 
characterised as follows: 
 
1. Religiousness (ethics) is transcendental in that the willing subject is a 
transcendental condition of the religious attitude.4  
 
2. The religious attitude is to be understood as an emotive response to the world 
or, at the very least, as something closely modelled on this notion of emotive 
response.5  
 
3. Although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus (i.e. 
the TLP 6.4ff) are nonsensical, they succeed in conveying or expressing the 
religious attitude that Wittgenstein endorses.6  
 
I propose that we misrepresent Wittgenstein’s position when we ascribe these views to 
him in the Tractatus. Although Wittgenstein may well have endorsed some or all of these 
views, at least to an extent, in the Notebooks period, he has in fact abandoned them by the 
time he comes to write the Tractatus. These views are not therefore representative of his 
position in the Tractatus. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  Different versions of this view appear in: Morris, M. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to 
Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (New York: Routledge, 2008) 320–328; Schroeder, 
S. Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle, (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) 99–104; and Stockhof, M. 
World and Life as One. Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought. (Palo Alto: Standford 
University Press, 2002), 202–203. 
5  Different versions of this view emerge in Morris op. cit. note 4, 324 and McGuinness, B. 
Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers, (London: Routledge, 2002) 141, amongst others. 
6  Different versions of this view emerge in Stokhof op. cit. note 4 and in Morris op. cit. note 4, 337–
338.  
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1. Religion without a Transcendental Subject 
 
a) The Transcendental Reading 
 
According to a widespread reading, which I will call the Transcendental Reading, 
Wittgenstein endorses, in the Tractatus, the notion of a transcendental subject as the 
condition of genuine religiousness (ethics) and – depending on the reading – 
representation.7 Wittgenstein certainly appears to endorse this notion of the subject – 
which he calls ‘willing subject’ – at several junctures in the Notebooks (NB 5.8.16). In the 
Transcendental Reading, this notion of ‘willing subject’ is retained in the Tractatus and, 
with it, the idea that genuinely ethical religiousness is transcendental: religiousness is 
transcendental in that the religious attitude is made possible by virtue of the actions of the 
transcendental willing subject. According to the Transcendental Reading, it is in this light 
that we should interpret Wittgenstein’s claim, in the Tractatus, that: 
 
Ethics is transcendental. (TLP 6.421) 
 
b) The transcendental ‘willing subject’ 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  See, for instance: Morris op. cit. note 4 320–328; Schroeder op. cit. note 4, 99–104; and Stokhof 
op. cit. note 4, 202–203. Peter Hacker places the emphasis on the view that the willing subject is the 
condition of representation – Hacker, P. M. S. Insight and Illusion. Themes in the Philosophy of 
Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 73–80. 
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One immediate problem with the Transcendental Reading is that the expression ‘willing 
subject’ is simply absent from the Tractatus. The closest that Wittgenstein comes to this 
notion in the Tractatus is in TLP 6.423, where he writes: 
 
It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical 
attributes. (TLP 6.423) 
 
However, even if we took this remark at face value as an attempt to convey something 
about the ethical will (which is problematic, as we will see below), it is highly unclear 
that it would provide evidence for the view that Wittgenstein continues to endorse, in the 
Tractatus, the notion of a willing subject. We could, instead, take this remark to show 
that Wittgenstein has shifted from the reified notion of a transcendental willing subject in 
the Notebooks to a deflated notion of ethical willing in the Tractatus. Similarly, it could 
be argued that Wittgenstein’s understanding of the way in which ‘ethics is 
transcendental’ (TLP 6.421) has itself become deflated in the move from the Notebooks 
to the Tractatus: Wittgenstein would have shifted from the Notebooks view that the 
willing subject is a transcendental condition of ethics to the deflated view that ethics is 
transcendental merely in that ethical willing is ineffable. Regardless of how one views the 
merits or demerits of such proposals, it seems clear that entries such as TLP 6.423 and 
TLP 6.421 cannot, on their own, be regarded as conclusive evidence for the view that 
Wittgenstein continues to endorse, in the Tractatus, the notion of willing subject from the 
Notebooks. 
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c) The ‘metaphysical subject’ 
 
At this point, it might be objected that, in fact, the evidence is not quite as slim as that. 
For perhaps Wittgenstein does retain the notion of ‘willing subject’ in the Tractatus, only 
under a different label: ‘metaphysical subject’. After all, Wittgenstein does use the 
expression ‘metaphysical subject’ in the Tractatus. Indeed, he appears actively to endorse 
it in TLP 5.641:  
 
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-
psychological way. 
 What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’. 
 The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human 
soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of 
the world – not a part of it. (TLP 5.641) 
 
The question before us is therefore: could the ‘metaphysical subject’ of TLP 5.641 be the 
willing subject of the Notebooks? In other words, is the ‘metaphysical subject’ of TLP 
5.641 regarded by Wittgenstein as a transcendental pre-condition of ethics? There are 
some serious problems with this suggestion. To begin with, there is simply no evidence, 
in the Notebooks, to suggest that Wittgenstein regards the expressions ‘willing subject’ 
and ‘metaphysical subject’ to be interchangeable. Both expressions appear in the 
Notebooks, but – crucially – they are never used alongside each other in the same entries.8 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  Indeed, the expression ‘metaphysical subject’ is only used in two entries of the Notebooks: in NB 
4.8.16 and in NB 2.9.16. 
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And there is nothing in the entries that do feature them (i.e. that do so separately) to 
suggest that Wittgenstein views these expressions as equivalent. In other words, there is 
nothing in the Notebooks to suggest that ‘metaphysical subject’ is synonymous with, or 
even analogous to, ‘willing subject’ for Wittgenstein.  
 But there is a second and more fundamental problem with arguing that the 
metaphysical subject of TLP 5.641 is the willing subject of the Notebooks. For TLP 5.641 
starts off by noting that ‘there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about’ the 
metaphysical subject. In the original, this reads: ‘Es gibt also wirklich einen Sinn, in 
welchem in der Philosophie nicht-psychologisch vom Ich die Rede sein kann.’ The 
mention of ‘die Rede’ in the original makes it clear that Wittgenstein’s claim is that it is 
possible to speak about the metaphysical subject. What is more, Wittgenstein appears to 
be suggesting that one of the tasks of philosophy is to continue talking about such a 
subject. If the metaphysical subject were the willing subject from the Notebooks, 
however, this would be deeply puzzling, however. For Wittgenstein would be advancing 
that the willing subject is a transcendental condition of the world (a limit in this sense), 
that the willing subject can be talked about, and that philosophers should continue talking 
about it. But such a position would surely be untenable for Wittgenstein: if the 
metaphysical subject were indeed the willing subject from the Notebooks, Wittgenstein 
should, at the very least, admit, in TLP 5.641, that the metaphysical subject cannot be 
talked about. The claim that the metaphysical subject ‘really’ (‘wirklich’) can be talked 
about, especially in conjunction with the suggestion that it is one of the tasks of 
philosophy to talk about such a subject, is totally mysterious if we understand 
‘metaphysical subject’ to be referring to the willing subject from the Notebooks. After all, 
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there is nothing in the sections of the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein discusses the role 
of philosophy (notably TLP 4.112, 4.114, 4.115, 4.116 and the Preface) to suggest that 
the task of philosophy should be to attempt to say or even to express what cannot be said. 
Independently of the position one may occupy in the New Wittgenstein debate, it is clear 
that there is a serious problem with this idea; this is indeed acknowledged by a variety of 
authors, many of whom could in no way be classed as neo-Wittgensteinians.9  
 
d) A shift in Wittgenstein’s position 
 
The evidence for the claim that the ‘willing subject’ from the Notebooks is the  
‘metaphysical subject’ is, in my view, virtually non-existent; in fact, as we have just seen, 
this claim runs counter the textual evidence from TLP 5.641 and other sections of the 
Tractatus. There is, in addition, one further set of considerations that arbitrates against 
this claim. Note indeed that, having endorsed the notion of willing subject in entries such 
as NB 5.8.16, the Notebooks discussion comes to a rather abrupt end in November of 
1916, with two entries that show Wittgenstein as having second thoughts about this 
notion: NB 9.11.16 and NB 19.11.16. NB 9.11.16 indicates that experience does not 
require the willing subject to be possible. Since experience is a type of thought, of mental 
representation (or picture) for Wittgenstein, NB 9.11.16 therefore advances that mental 
representation does not require the willing subject. In the next entry (i.e. NB 19.11.16), 
Wittgenstein considers an even stronger suggestion: the suggestion that there may in fact 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  Bernard Williams mentions this difficulty in Williams, B. ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, Moral 
Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 144–163, 146. 
David Pears also admits that this is a serious problem - Pears. D. The False Prison, Vol. 1, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987) 184–185. 
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be no reason whatsoever to posit a willing subject. In other words, in NB 19.11.16, 
Wittgenstein is considering abandoning the notion of willing subject in its entirety: he is 
considering abandoning the notion of a transcendental subject understood as a condition 
of representation or of ethics. I propose that Wittgenstein does indeed end up abandoning 
this notion in or shortly after November 1916 – and certainly before he starts working on 
the final version of the Tractatus.   
 That Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics and religion undergoes a significant 
change precisely around this time is corroborated by his correspondence with Paul 
Engelmann. Wittgenstein’s thoughts about the willing subject develop most rapidly 
during the weeks he spends with Engelmann, whom he meets in Olmütz in October 
1916.10 We know that many of the conversations between Wittgenstein and Engelmann 
during this period focus on Schopenhauer’s approach to ethics, an approach that posits a 
transcendental notion of the subject very much like that of the ‘willing subject’ from the 
Notebooks.11 The strongly Schopenhauerian remarks from the Notebooks end abruptly in 
late November 1916, with the two entries I mentioned above (NB 9.11.16 and NB 
19.11.16). Shortly thereafter, Wittgenstein leaves Olmütz to travel to Vienna for 
Christmas and then returns to the front. By the time Engelmann and Wittgenstein meet 
again in December 1917, it is clear to Engelmann that Wittgenstein has had an important 
change of heart. In January 1918, Engelmann writes a letter in which he expresses his 
concern over Wittgenstein’s religious condition. Referring to their recent meeting, in 
December 1917, Engelmann writes: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  See NB 12.10.16; 15.10.16; 17.10.16; 20.10.16; 4.11.16; 9.11.16; and 19.11.16 
11  That Wittgenstein and Engelmann repeatedly discuss Schopenhauer’s views during their stay in 
Olmütz emerges in McGuinness, B. Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 252 – 253. 
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It seemed to me as if you – in contrast to the time you spent in Olmütz, where I 
had not thought so – had no faith. 
 
To this, Wittgenstein replies: 
 
If you tell me I have no faith, you are perfectly right, only I did not have it before 
either. […] I am clear about one thing: I am far too bad to be able to theorize 
about myself; in fact, I shall either remain a swine or else I shall improve, and 
that’s that! Only let’s cut out the transcendental twaddle when the whole thing is 
as plain as a sock on the jaw. [My italics in the last instance]12 
 
Wittgenstein’s reply to Engelmann betrays an important change in Wittgenstein’s attitude 
to (and tolerance of) the transcendental approach to religion and ethics that had been the 
focus of so many of his conversations with Engelmann in Olmütz, in the autumn of 1916. 
A likely explanation for this change would be that, having explored the Schopenhauerian, 
transcendental approach in depth in his conversations with Engelmann, Wittgenstein had, 
during the time they had spent apart, concluded that this approach should in fact be 
discarded: the notion of transcendental willing subject has ended up ‘falling apart in his 
hands’.13 I therefore propose that, by the winter of 1917 – 1918, when Wittgenstein is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  These letters are cited in Monk, R. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1991) 152–153. 
13  I am borrowing this expression from Warren Goldfarb and Peter Sullivan - Goldfarb, W. 
‘Metaphysics as Nonsense: On Cora Diamond’s The Realistic Spirit’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 
52, 57–73 (1997), 71; Sullivan,  P. ‘“The General Propositional Form is a Variable.” (Tractatus 4.53)’, 
Mind 113, 449,  43–56 (2004), 43. 
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writing the remarks that would come to form the Prototractatus, he has already 
abandoned the Schopenhauerian notion of transcendental willing subject as condition of 
representation, religiousness and ethics. This would indeed explain why there is no 
mention of the willing subject in the Prototractatus, the Tractatus or indeed the 
Notebooks, after the 19th of November 1916. 
  In my view, the notion of ‘metaphysical subject’ that emerges in the Tractatus’ 
discussion of solipsism (in the TLP 5.6ff) is different from the notion of ‘willing subject’ 
from the Notebooks. The metaphysical subject at the heart of the solipsism discussion is 
not a transcendental condition of ethics, religiousness or, indeed, of representation; I 
defend this view elsewhere.14 We must therefore find a way of accounting for the 
religious and ethical dimension of the Tractatus that does not present Wittgenstein as 
endorsing this notion of willing subject as transcendental condition.  
 
2. The Purpose of the Tractatus15 
 
a) The ethical point of the Tractatus 
 
There is no doubt that Wittgenstein regards the Tractatus as having an important ethical 
or religious dimension. This emerges most clearly in his 1919 letter to Ludwig Ficker, 
where Wittgenstein writes that ‘the point of the book is an ethical’. 16 In this letter, he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  Tejedor, C. ‘Solipsism in the Tractatus’, Sentido y sinsentido: Wittgenstein y la crítica del 
lenguaje, ed. C. Moya, (Valencia: Pre-Textos, 2008) and Tejedor, C. (Forthcoming) An End to Philosophy: 
Language, Metaphysics and Value in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. 
15  On this, see also Kremer, M. ‘The Purpose of Tractarian Nonsense’, Noûs 35, 39–73 (2001). 
16  Letter cited in McGuinness op. cit. note 11, ch. 9. Some commentators have argued that 
Wittgenstein may be merely trying to entice a reluctant publisher by presenting his book as having an 
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which indicates both that the Tractatus has an ethical purpose and that this purpose can 
only be fulfilled by being silent about ethics. This notion of silence in ethics emerges 
once again in the main text of the Tractatus (TLP 6.42, TLP 6.421). 
 The claim that ethics cannot be put into words gives rise to an obvious tension, 
however – one that lies at the very heart of the Tractatus. For, if ethics cannot be put into 
words, if there can be no ‘propositions of ethics’, how can a book – something that is, on 
the face of it, made up of words – have an ethical dimension? Part of my aim in what 
follows is to defend a new approach to this fundamental question of Tractarian 
scholarship. 
 
b) Clarifying formal concepts 
  
Wittgenstein’s approach to religion and ethics in the Tractatus is intimately connected to 
what he regards as the central aim of his book. I suggest that the Tractatus aims, first and 
foremost, at the clarification of certain formal concepts, concepts such as those of 
proposition and thought.17 Clarifying formal concepts involves fine-tuning our practical 
abilities in relation to the use of signs. For instance, clarifying the formal concept of 
proposition involves fine-tuning our practical abilities relating to the use of linguistic 
signs to form senseful and senseless propositions. For Wittgenstein, it is very important 
that this process should involve the fine-tuning of practical abilities (of skills) we already !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
ethical point. In my view, however, Wittgenstein’s insistence on the ethical dimension of the Tractatus 
needs to be taken seriously. On this, see Glock, H-J, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 
330 and Tejedor (Forthcoming) op. cit, note 14. 
17  I develop this further in Tejedor (Forthcoming) op. cit, note 14. Although our views ultimately 
diverge, I am indebted to Marie McGinn’s discussion of formal concepts for the genesis of my thoughts on 
this issue – McGinn, M. Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Logic and 
Language. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) ch 7. 
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possess. In this respect, the process of conceptual clarification in which the Tractatus 
engages us aims at drawing our attention to our pre-existing, pre-theoretical linguistic and 
thinking practices – to the way in which we use signs ordinarily, when we are outside the 
distorting context of traditional philosophical enquiry. 
 For Wittgenstein, the exercise of those practical abilities involved in the mastery 
of formal concepts – i.e. our use of signs – is ineffable: it is not describable by, reducible 
to, translatable into or capturable by propositions, thoughts or, indeed, pictures of any 
kind. To say something is to use facts of a certain kind (i.e. propositional signs) to 
represent other possible states: but this use – the use that turns factive propositional signs 
into factive propositions (i.e. into linguistic representations) – is not itself factive. 18 Here, 
in my view, lies the crux of Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction: our use of a sign 
shows what symbol the sign expresses and our mastery of the related formal concept is 
shown in our use of such a sign. This emerges in many different entries from the 
Tractatus, notably in TLP 4.1212, TLP 3.262, TLP 4.126, TLP 3.326 and TLP 3.327. 
 Wittgenstein suggests that our mastery of the formal concept of proposition – that 
is, the mastery demonstrated in the use we make of propositional signs to express 
propositions – is ineffable: it manifests itself in our use of propositional signs, but it 
cannot itself be described by means of propositions. This is an idea we will return to 
below. 
  
c) Contingency,  necessity and the sense of absolute control 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  As we will see below, propositions, like thoughts, are representing facts for Wittgenstein (TLP 
3.14 & TLP 3.12) 
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For Wittgenstein, the process in which the Tractatus engages us aims at the clarification 
of formal concepts, notably those of proposition, thought and picture. In particular, this 
process, when successful, culminates in our coming to use signs  – linguistic, psychical or 
iconic – in such a way as to reflect that there is no necessity outside logic (TLP 6.37). 
More specifically, this process culminates in a use signs that reflects that: 
 
a) The world is fundamentally contingent  
b) The notion of causal necessity is nonsensical 
c) The notion that human beings are in absolute control of certain facts (i.e. in 
the kind of control that implies causal necessity) is nonsensical 
 
As we will see shortly, these three positions are intimately connected to each other, for 
Wittgenstein: treating the world as fundamentally contingent involves treating the notions 
of causal necessity and of absolute control as nonsensical. I will return to this below. 
Before I do so, however, I would like to address an initial objection that emerges at this 
point.19 The objection can be put as follows: why exactly should the acceptance of the 
view that the world is fundamentally contingent go hand in hand with a rejection of the 
notions of causal necessity and absolute control? After all, some have argued that the 
fundamental contingency of the world is in fact compatible with both causal necessity 
and with the notion of absolute control. Simone Weil, for instance, holds both that the 
world is fundamentally contingent and that it is governed by causal necessity. Indeed, the 
possibility of combining these two notions is central to her project of attempting to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19  I am grateful to Anthony O’Hear for his generous discussion of this objection. 
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reconcile God as creator with the existence of suffering in the world. For Weil, the world 
is fundamentally contingent in that it could have failed to obtain, since the initial creation 
of the world is an exercise in God’s freedom in love. In so far as the creation of the world 
results from God’s absolute freedom, the world could not have obtained at all – it is in 
this respect that the world is fundamentally contingent, for Weil. Nevertheless, the world 
thus created is a world that is governed by causal necessity – and that must indeed be so if 
God’s ontological independence is to be safeguarded.20  
 In Weil’s view, there is no difficulty in claiming both that the world is 
fundamentally contingent and that it is governed by causal necessity. The question before 
us is therefore: why does Wittgenstein rule out this option? Why does he suggest that 
becoming clear about the fundamental contingency of the world involves rejecting causal 
necessity (and the associated notion of absolute control) as nonsensical?  
 The answer to this question lies in Wittgenstein’s highly specific understanding of 
the notion of fundamental contingency and on the motivations that drive this 
understanding. Although this cannot be fully addressed in the space available, I will, in 
what follows, offer an initial approximation to it. 
 
d) Contingency: senseful propositions and possible states 
 
In order to understand Wittgenstein’s rejection of causal necessity, it is important to 
revisit his approach to contingency, as it emerges in the treatment he gives to pictures and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20  Weil, S. Notebooks, II, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976) 402; Weil, S. Waiting for God, 
(New York: Perennial Classics, 2001) 99; Weil, S. Gravity and Grace, (London: Routledge, 2004) 32 – 33. 
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possible states. Wittgenstein indicates that senseful propositions, thoughts and iconic 
representations are all pictures. Senseful propositions, like other pictures: 
 
i) are either determinately true or determinately false [bivalence]  
ii) are both capable of being true and capable of being false [bipolarity] 
iii) are informative about the reality [informativeness] 
iv) ultimately decompose into elementary propositions that are logically 
independent from each other [logical independence] and that are made up 
exclusively of simple names [simplicity of meaning] 
 
Let us briefly consider iii) and iv). Senseful propositions purport to convey information 
about reality – information that may be unknown to some language speakers. 
Communicating new senses to each other is a central purpose – and part of the essence –
 of senseful language. Indeed, the informativeness of a proposition goes hand in hand 
with its sensefulness. Propositions are informative in that they depict possible states of 
the world, possible ways in which reality might be; but that is precisely why they are 
senseful. The information conveyed by a senseful proposition may turn out to be false, if 
the depicted possible state does not obtain as a fact in reality. Nevertheless, the main 
purpose of senseful language is to be informative and speakers use senseful propositions 
to convey to others information that may be new to them. 
 
It belongs to the essence of the proposition that it should be able to communicate a 
new sense to us. (TLP 4.027) 
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In connection to this it is important to note that, according to Wittgenstein, the natural 
sciences aim to produce true informative senseful propositions. Natural scientists aim to 
produce contingently true, informative descriptions of the facts that make up reality: facts 
that could have happened not to obtain and that could be unknown to language speakers. 
 In spite of this aim, some of the propositions produced by the natural sciences are, 
of course, false. After all, sometimes the natural sciences get things wrong: sometimes 
they make mistakes and produce false descriptions of reality (as, for instance, with the 
pre-Copernican view that the sun revolves round the earth). Nevertheless, their aim (their 
purpose) is to produce propositions that are contingently true and therefore informative. It 
with this in mind that Wittgenstein writes, in the Tractatus: 
 
The totality of true propositions is the whole of the natural sciences (or the whole 
corpus of the natural sciences). (TLP 4.11) 
 
Contingently true senseful propositions are therefore central to Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of the role of the natural sciences. The importance of this idea will become 
clear below. 
 Let us now consider iv), that is, the idea that elementary propositions are logically 
independent from each other. For Wittgenstein, elementary propositions are the logically 
most basic type of senseful proposition: elementary propositions cannot be analysed into 
further propositions and consist exclusively of simple names (TLP 4.21ff). Elementary 
propositions are logically independent from one another in that the truth-value of one 
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elementary proposition cannot determine the truth-value of another. Non-elementary 
senseful propositions arise from the application of logical operations to elementary 
propositions; this is indeed why the former can be logically analysed into the latter. And 
the truth-value combinations of elementary propositions determine the truth-values of the 
resulting non-elementary propositions.  
 Wittgenstein indicates that senseful propositions depict possibilities, possible 
states of reality: elementary propositions depict states of affairs and non-elementary 
propositions depict more complex possible situations. Possible states (i.e. states of affairs 
and possible situations) are such that they: 
 
i*) either determinately obtain or determinately fail to obtain  
ii*) are both capable of obtaining and capable of failing to obtain 
iii*) ultimately decompose into states of affairs that are logically independent 
from each other and that are exclusively made up of simple objects. 
 
States of affairs are the logically most basic type of possible state. They are logically 
independent from each other in that the obtaining or non-obtaining of one state of affairs 
does not entail the obtaining or failing to obtain of another. For Wittgenstein, the logical 
independence of elementary propositions and that of states of affairs is a requirement of 
his commitment to the combinatorial nature of sense.21 
 
e) Necessary truth and senseless propositions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21  This has been insightfully discussed elsewhere, notably by Zalabardo - Zalabardo, J. L. ‘The 
Tractatus on Logical Consequence’, European Journal of Philosophy, 18, 3, 425–442 (2010) 431. 
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One of the corollaries of the logical independence of states of affairs is that there can be 
no necessary connections between them: the obtaining of one state of affairs cannot 
necessitate the obtaining of another. This is reflected at the level of elementary 
propositions in that the truth of one elementary proposition cannot entail the truth of 
another. Necessary connections of entailment only arise at a higher level of complexity. 
The reason for this is that, according to Wittgenstein, it is only at this higher level of 
complexity that conceptual relations – that is, relations that can be transparently revealed 
through logical analysis – start to emerge. Imagine that a possible situation A is 
analysable as the conjunction of the more basic possible situation a and other possible 
situations. If so, A will necessitate or entail a by virtue of the conceptual relations 
between them. And this will be reflected in the non-elementary propositions that 
represent A and a – let us call these propositions ‘A’ and ‘a’, for the sake of simplicity. 
Imagine, for instance, that the propositions in question are ‘John is a bachelor’ (‘A’) and 
‘John is unmarried’ (‘a’). The proposition ‘John is a bachelor’ entails the proposition 
‘John is unmarried’ by virtue of the conceptual connections between the two since ‘John 
is a bachelor’ is analysable into the conjunction of ‘John is unmarried’ and other 
propositions. This relation of entailment can me made evident through the use of truth-
tables, in particular, by constructing the truth-table for the further proposition ‘If John is a 
bachelor, John is unmarried’. Such a truth-table would show this further proposition to be 
a tautology, thereby revealing the connection between ‘John is a bachelor’ and ‘John is 
unmarried’.  
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 In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between senseful propositions and 
senseless propositions such as necessarily true tautologies and necessarily false 
contradictions (TLP 4.46). Since elementary propositions are logically independent from 
each other, senseless tautologies and contradictions only arise at a higher level of 
complexity, when a sufficient number of logical operations have been applied to 
elementary propositions for conceptual relations to arise. For Wittgenstein, senseless 
propositions are a corollary of senseful language. They are senseless rather than 
nonsensical in that they result from applying logical operations to senseful propositions. 
In this respect, senseless propositions are, like senseful propositions, ‘part of the 
symbolism’ (TLP 4.4611). Unlike senseful propositions, however, the purpose of 
senseless propositions is not to convey information about reality: senseless propositions 
do not depict possible states of the world, they say nothing (and purport to say nothing) 
about the state of reality. Senseless propositions are altogether uninformative about 
reality – this is indeed why they are senseless.  
 
Tautologies and contradictions lack sense. […] 
(For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining 
or not raining.) (TLP 4.461) 
 
3. Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Causal Necessity 
 
Having revisited Wittgenstein’s notions of contingency and necessity, through our 
discussion of senseful propositions, possible states and senseless propositions, we are 
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now in a position to explain why rejecting the notion of causal necessity as nonsensical 
goes hand in hand with being clear about the fundamental contingency of the world. I 
will begin this section with a brief overview of the Causal Necessity View and will then 
present two sets of considerations that expose this view as nonsensical, according to 
Wittgenstein.  
 
a) The Causal Necessity View 
 
The Causal Necessity View rejected by Wittgenstein suggests that facts (elements of 
reality) can be necessarily connected to each other, not by virtue of conceptual relations 
between them, but by virtue of certain laws of nature governing reality. Imagine that A is 
an obtaining possible state, a fact; and imagine further that A causes possible state C also 
to obtain as a fact. Advocates of the Causal Necessity View would argue that, if A really 
is the cause of C, then A necessitates or entails C. However, this necessary connection, 
this relation of entailment, is not, in their view, one that arises by virtue of the conceptual 
relations between A and C. Imagine, for instance, that the presence of a flame (under 
certain specified circumstances) causes a piece of wax to melt. In other words, imagine 
that there is a genuine causal relation between these two obtaining possible states. 
Advocates of the Causal Necessity View would suggest that, in this scenario, the 
presence of the flame (under the specified circumstances) necessitates or entails the 
melting of the wax. In their view, however, this necessary relation of entailment arises, 
not by virtue of any conceptual relations between the two possible states, but by virtue of 
something else – namely, by virtue of the fact that certain laws of nature govern reality. 
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According to Wittgenstein, this position betrays a number of fundamental confusions and 
misunderstandings, as we will now see.  
 
b) No necessity outside logic 
 
For Wittgenstein, being clear about the formal concepts of senseful proposition and of 
possible state involves treating signs in such a way as to reflect i) – iv). Furthermore, it 
involves treating signs in such a way as to reflect that necessary relations of entailment 
between propositions (or between possible states) arise only by virtue of conceptual 
relations between them – relations that do not emerge at the level of elementary 
propositions and states of affairs. Advocates of the Causal Necessity View, in contrast, do 
not use signs in this way: their use of signs suggests that there can be necessary 
connections between propositions (or between possible states) that are not conceptual in 
nature, thereby opening the way for such connections to arise at any level complexity 
(including at that of elementary propositions and states of affairs). But this, for 
Wittgenstein, betrays a fundamental lack of clarity as to what it is for something to be a 
senseful proposition or a possible state in the first place: it betrays a lack of mastery in 
certain key formal concepts. For, given Wittgenstein’s approach to the combinatorial 
nature of sense, necessary relations of entailment can only arises from conceptual, logical 
relations: there is no necessity outside logic (TLP 6.37). 22    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  Note indeed that Wittgenstein’s use of truth tables to reveal the combinatorial nature of sense and 
his view that truth tables render the signs for logical connectives superfluous is incompatible with the 
Causal Necessity View. For his whole approach is predicated on the idea that only propositions connected 
to each other by virtue of conceptual relations (i.e. by virtue of relations that can be transparently revealed 
through logical analysis) can entail each other. Wittgenstein’s rejection of causal necessity therefore runs 
very deep and permeates his entire position in the Tractatus. 
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 In addition, the Causal Necessity View also betrays a more basic 
misunderstanding concerning the notions of contingency and necessity. For Wittgenstein, 
both contingency and necessity are purely logical notions in that they are both 
characterised by a particular type of independence.23 Consider contingency first. For 
Wittgenstein, it is crucial that the contingency of possible states and the contingency of 
propositions should be independent from reality. More specifically, whether a possible 
state satisfies i*) – iii*) cannot itself be dependent on whether a certain other state obtains 
(or fails to obtain) as a matter of fact, in reality. A state only counts as contingent in the 
required respect when its satisfying i*) – iii*) is guaranteed independently of what 
happens to obtain in reality (of the facts). Similarly, that propositions satisfy i) – iv) and 
thereby possess a sense is guaranteed independently of the facts and, therefore, of the 
truth of any other propositions. This, in Wittgenstein’s view, is a requirement of the very 
possibility of sense, as is made clear in his discussion of simples:24 
 
If the world had no substance [i.e. if logical analysis did not ultimately reveal 
simples], then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another 
proposition was true. (TLP 2.0211)  
 
In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false). (TLP 2.0212)  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23  There are other respects in which contingency and necessity are ‘purely logical’ for Wittgenstein, 
but it is this notion of independence from reality that is crucial for our purposes. 
24  Glock op. cit. note 16, 269–274 and Tejedor, C. ‘Sense and Simplicity: Wittgenstein’s Argument 
for Simple Objects’, Ratio (new series) XVI, 272–289 (2003). 
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In the above entries, Wittgenstein indicates that, if the sensefulness of a proposition 
(‘whether a proposition had sense’ – TLP 2.0211) were dependent on the truth of another, 
there would be no senseful language and, indeed, no senseful pictures of any sort (‘we 
could not sketch any picture of the world’ – TLP 2.0212). The contingency of states (and, 
correspondingly, the contingency and sense of propositions) is guaranteed from a purely 
logical point of view, independently of which propositions are true and which facts 
happen to obtain in reality. Recognising this is part and parcel of recognising what it is 
for a proposition to be senseful and recognising a proposition as senseful is recognising 
that it is contingent in this particular way.  
 Necessity too, for Wittgenstein, involves a particular type of independence from 
what happens to obtain, as a fact, in reality. This emerges with particular force in his 
discussion of senseless tautologies, where it is made clear that regarding a tautology as 
necessarily true involves regarding it as true independently of what may happen to obtain, 
in reality (TLP 4.6, 4.461, 4.463).25  
 At the very heart of Wittgenstein’s position is therefore the idea that both 
contingency and necessity are guaranteed independently of what happens to obtain, as a 
matter of fact, in reality. The Causal Necessity View, in contrast, runs directly counter 
this view. For it suggests that causes guarantee (i.e. necessitate) their effects by virtue of 
the fact that certain laws govern reality. For Wittgenstein, this is a hybrid and 
fundamentally ill-conceived notion. It is a hybrid notion in that it attempts to ally together 
the idea of something being guaranteed with the idea of that guarantee stemming from a 
contingent fact. But, in Wittgenstein’s view, pace his discussion of simples, a contingent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Glock op. cit. note 16, 198 – 202 
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fact (e.g. that certain laws of nature are at work) cannot offer the required guarantee. And 
being clear about the formal concepts of senseful proposition, possible state and senseless 
proposition involves treating this notion of a contingency-based guarantee as nonsensical. 
 
c) Causation and the natural sciences 
  
This leads us to a further problem with the Causal Necessity View, one concerning the 
role played by causation in the natural sciences. In TLP 6.36 – 6.362, Wittgenstein 
acknowledges that causation is at the very heart of our understanding of the natural 
sciences. Indeed, one of the central purposes of the natural sciences is to informatively 
and accurately describe the causal relations that hold between facts. But, for 
Wittgenstein, a proposition is only informative when it is senseful, that is, when it is 
contingent (in the sense of satisfying i – iv). Since necessary truth, for Wittgenstein, is the 
mark of senselessness and therefore of uninformativeness, a scientific description of a 
certain causal chain cannot be both informative and necessarily true. In this respect, the 
Causal Necessity View fundamentally distorts the role played by causal descriptions in 
the natural sciences  
 For Wittgenstein, the notion of causal necessity is a particularly damaging 
philosophical construct (TLP 5.136 – 5.1362). Falling prey to the illusion of causal 
necessity involves acting as if propositions that are not connected to each other by means 
of conceptual relations of logical entailment are nevertheless necessarily connected to 
each other in some other – ‘causal’ – way. Wittgenstein is not, in the Tractatus, hostile to 
the idea that causal relations might hold between facts. There is, indeed, in his view, a 
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viable understanding of causation (cf. TLP 6.321, TLP 6.36). However, this 
understanding of causation does not include the Causal Necessity View: causation, 
properly understood, does not involve necessary connections between facts (TLP 5.136 –
 5.1362).26  
 
d) Wittgenstein’s rejection of the notion of absolute control 
  
As we have just seen, the notion of causal – or material – necessity is a piece of 
philosophical nonsense, in Wittgenstein’s view. For him, the process of conceptual 
clarification of the Tractatus culminates, when successful, in a use of signs that reflects 
that there are no necessary relations between facts other than conceptual relations. When 
successful, this process therefore enables us not to fall prey to this particular type of 
philosophical nonsense. 
 And this, in turn, involves shedding a particular understanding of ourselves as 
being in absolute control of certain aspects of the world. For the notion of absolute 
control – of being able causally to guarantee the obtaining or non-obtaining of certain 
facts – is fuelled by that of causal necessity. So much so that the misconceived sense of 
being in absolute control vanishes when we recognise the notion of causal necessity as 
nonsensical: when we come to ‘see the world aright’ (TLP 6.54). Our sense of being in 
absolute control vanishes when the process of conceptual clarification of the Tractatus 
succeeds in fine-tuning our linguistic and thinking abilities, so that our use of signs 
comes to reflect the fundamental contingency of facts.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26  For further details, see Tejedor (Forthcoming) op. cit, note 14. 
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 In Wittgenstein’s view, therefore, the process of conceptual clarification of the 
Tractatus results, when successful, in our coming to recognise as nonsensical both the 
notion of causal necessity and the related notion that we – human beings – are in absolute 
(i.e. causally necessitating) control of certain aspects of the world.  
 
There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. 
The only necessity that exists is logical necessity. (TLP 6.37) 
 
4. An Ethics of Conceptual Clarity 
 
a) Facts, contingency and ethics 
 
According to Wittgenstein, obtaining possible states, pictures, propositions, thoughts and, 
indeed, empirical selves and minds (consisting of logical arrangements of thoughts) are 
all facts (TLP 2, TLP 2.141, TLP 3, TLP 3.14, TLP 5.542, TLP 5.5421). And all facts (be 
they representing facts, such as propositions and thoughts, or represented facts, such as 
obtaining possible states) are fundamentally contingent. Propositions, thoughts and 
generally pictures are contingent in that they satisfy i) – iv); in turn, possible states are 
contingent in that they satisfy i) – iii). In addition, all facts are fundamentally contingent 
in that there are no necessary relations of entailment other than those arising from 
conceptual or logical relations. For Wittgenstein, being clear as to the fundamental 
contingency of facts involves using signs in such a way as to reflect this fundamental 
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contingency. But what, precisely, is the connection between this kind of conceptual 
clarity and ethics?   
 Wittgenstein suggests that, given the fundamental contingency of facts, it is a 
source of profound wonder that any possible state should obtain as a fact. This sense of 
wonder arises in connection to all facts: physical facts (involving the rocks, plants, 
animals and human physical bodies we describe in language and think about) but also 
mental facts (i.e. our thoughts, desires, beliefs, emotions and, more broadly, our minds 
and empirical selves). Being clear in one’s grasp of certain formal concepts involves 
being disposed to use signs in particular ways so as to reflect the fundamental 
contingency of facts. But this involves treating ourselves (i.e. human beings) as facts on a 
par, with respect to their contingency, with all other facts in the world. For Wittgenstein, 
using signs in such a way as to reflect that we (empirical selves) are exactly on a par with 
all other facts in the world is displaying a religious attitude to the world. So being 
conceptually clear – in particular, avoiding the illusion of absolute control – is having a 
religious or ethical attitude of wonder at the fundamental contingency of the world. 
 
b) A non-emotive, dispositional religious attitude 
  
For Wittgenstein, using signs in such a way as to reflect the fundamental contingency of 
facts is displaying a religious, ethically correct attitude to the world. But how exactly are 
we to understand this notion of religious attitude? Here, it is important to emphasise that, 
for Wittgenstein, the religious or ethical attitude is not an emotive attitude: the ethico-
religious attitude does not involve experiencing certain emotive responses to the world. 
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Note indeed that emotions are describable mental facts – facts that are on a par with all 
other facts in the world. That mental facts have no ethical currency is made clear in the 
following passage from ‘A Lecture on Ethics’:  
 
But what I mean is that a state of mind, so far as we mean by that a fact which we 
can describe, is in no ethical sense good or bad. If for instance in our world-book 
we read the description of a murder […]. Certainly the reading of this description 
might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain 
or rage caused by this murder in other people when they heard of it, but there will 
simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics. [My italics] (LOE, 11) 
 
The religious or ethical attitude is not a form of emotive response. For emotions are 
mental facts that have, in and of themselves, no ethical dimension: mental facts are 
ethically neutral.27 Instead, I suggest that the religious or ethical attitude is dispositional, 
for Wittgenstein: it is the disposition to use signs in such a way as to reflect the 
fundamental contingency of all facts. Having a religious or ethical attitude to the world is 
being clear about certain formal concepts, it is having certain practical abilities honed in, 
so as to be disposed to use signs in particular ways. Being in such a state of conceptual 
clarity might cause one to experience certain emotions, but these emotions, in and of 
themselves, do not constitute the ethical attitude. These emotions are epiphenomenal to 
the ethico-religious attitude: they are phenomena that tend to accompany the attitude (at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27  In particular, the religious attitude is not the type of emotive attitude characterised by the 
abandoning or letting go of desire. For desire (‘the empirical will that is of interest only to psychology’ – 
TLP 6.423) is also factive for Wittgenstein, and, therefore, in and of itself, devoid of either positive or 
negative ethical value. Note indeed that both pursuing desire and attempting to let go of desire can be done 
out of an illusory sense of absolute control and therefore be unethical. 
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least in Wittgenstein’s own personal case, as he attests to in LOE 8), but they are neither 
constitutive, nor in any way necessary to the attitude.28 
 
5. Ineffability and the status of religious pseudo-propositions 
  
In this final section, I would like to explore in more detail Wittgenstein’s notion of 
religious or ethical ineffability and the status he ascribes to religious and ethical pseudo-
propositions.  
 
a) Ineffability and ethics 
 
In ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledges that religious or ethical 
propositions – that is, sentences used with the purpose of trying to express religious or 
ethical insights – are nonsensical (LOE 8). The question before us at this point is 
therefore: are such propositions nevertheless expressive of ethical insights? More 
specifically: are such propositions, in spite of their nonsense, adequate vehicles for the 
expression of the ethico-religious attitude, in Wittgenstein’s view? I suggest that they are 
not. For, as we saw above, the religious or ethical attitude is precisely one of conceptual 
clarity; and attempting to express or communicate such conceptual clarity through a 
nonsensical – that is a conceptually confused – use of signs has to be self-defeating. 
Indeed, a nonsensical use of signs is usually the symptom of conceptual confusion – not 
the mark of conceptual clarity. And nonsense tends to breed further nonsense; this is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28  I am on this point indebted to Severin Schroeder’s intriguing discussion of Wittgenstein’s later 
approach to religiousness – Schroeder  op. cit. note 1, 456.  
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indeed why it is so pernicious, according to Wittgenstein. Nonsensical – conceptually 
confused – ethical or religious propositions cannot be regarded as vehicles for the 
expression of conceptual clarity: they are not conveyors of – or even adequate markers 
for – the ethical or religious attitude.29 
 For Wittgenstein, the ethico-religious attitude is a disposition to use signs in such 
a way as to reflect the fundamental contingency of facts: it is a disposition to use signs in 
way that demonstrates one’s mastery of – one’s clarity in – certain formal concepts. We 
demonstrate our mastery of formal concepts whenever we use signs to express senseful 
propositions and whenever we refrain from using signs to produce nonsense. In this 
respect, it could perhaps be argued that senseful language – senseful language as a whole 
– might be an adequate vehicle for the expression of the ethico-religious attitude. If 
nonsense is incapable of expressing the ethico-religious attitude, perhaps senseful 
language – language in its entirety – can. Interestingly, Wittgenstein considers and then 
rejects this very idea in ‘A Lecture on Ethics’:  
 
Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for the miracle of the 
existence of the world, though it is not any proposition in language, is the existence 
of language itself. But what then does it mean to be aware of this miracle at some 
times and not at other times? For all I have said by shifting the expression of the 
miraculous from an expression by means of language to the expression by the 
existence of language, all I have said is again that we cannot express what we want 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  In this respect, they do not have the kind of relation to the attitude in question that sentences might 
bear to the emotions they express: emotive sentences can be viewed as expressing emotions without 
distorting them in this fundamental way.  
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to express and that all we say about the absolute miraculous remains nonsense. […] 
I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not 
yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very 
essence. (LOE 11)  
 
Senseful language cannot be regarded as a marker for the ethical attitude in that senseful 
language as a whole – the totality of senseful propositions – fails to pick out anything in 
particular. But this simply goes to show that the ethical attitude cannot be conveyed in 
language in any way. Ultimately, for Wittgenstein, the reason for this is that approaching 
something (here a certain attitude) as if it could be conveyed in language (if only we 
could find ‘the correct expressions’), is already treating it as non-ethical. Approaching 
something as if it can be conveyed in language is already treating it from the perspective 
of the natural sciences, rather than that of ethics. This emerges clearly in Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of the notion of a miracle, in ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ (LOE 10). 
 Language – whether senseful language as a whole or nonsensical propositions – is 
incapable of conveying the ethico-religious attitude. The problem is not merely that 
propositions – senseful or nonsensical – cannot say or express such an attitude; the 
problem is that presenting such an attitude as if it could be conveyed in language (if only 
we could find ‘the correct expressions’ – LOE 11) fundamentally distorts its ethical 
nature. For approaching something as if it can conveyed in language is already 
approaching it in a factive, non-ethical manner.  
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b) The status of the ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus 
 
As we have just seen, religious or ethical propositions – that is, sentences used with the 
purpose of attempting to express religious or ethical insights – are nonsensical. Indeed 
any attempt to express ethico-religious insights through language automatically distorts 
such insights and is self-defeating. Given this, Wittgenstein’s decision to include, in the 
TLP 6.4ff, a series of ethico-religious propositions may seem deeply puzzling. What, we 
may ask, is the role played by these propositions in the Tractatus? What role does 
Wittgenstein intend them to play?  
 In my view, Wittgenstein cannot have regarded these nonsensical propositions as 
responsible for capturing and expressing any ethical insights yielded by the Tractatus. 
The Tractatus has an ethical purpose, not because it contains, in the TLP 6.4ff, a series of 
propositions that express ethical insights in spite of their nonsensicality, but because the 
book – as a whole – enables us to hone in our mastery of certain formal concepts. The 
process of conceptual clarification in which the Tractatus engages us leads us, when 
successful, to using signs in such a way as to reflect the fundamental contingency of 
facts; and since the ethico-religious attitude is precisely the disposition to use signs this 
way, successfully engaging in this process is, in and of itself, undergoing a powerful 
ethical transformation, in Wittgenstein’s view. 
 The question of how, according to Wittgenstein, the Tractatus succeeds in 
delivering this process of conceptual clarification is a complex one that cannot, for 
reasons of space, be addressed here.30 It is worth noting, however, that part of the method 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30  I discuss this in Tejedor (Forthcoming) op. cit, note 14. 
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of the Tractatus involves reminding us that any given arrangement of signs can be used 
in different ways to produce senseful, senseless and nonsensical propositions. In this 
respect, I suggest that the sentences in the TLP 6.4ff are put to us so that we exercise our 
linguistic muscles (our practical linguistic abilities) against them. Note indeed that these 
sentences can be read in different ways. Consider for instance the claim, in TLP 6.431, 
that ‘at death the world […] comes to an end’. If we read this as an attempt to comment 
on the death of the transcendental willing subject, the proposition thus expressed is 
nonsensical, since the notion of willing subject is plain nonsense Wittgenstein. If, in 
contrast, we read the sentence as asserting that the physical world ended with the death of 
some particular empirical self, the sentence expresses a contingently false senseful 
proposition. The point here is that a sentence such as ‘at death the world […] comes to an 
end’ (TLP 6.431) can be read in a myriad of ways; but what we learn, by considering 
different readings  – different uses – of this sentence, is that none of them genuinely 
preserves the apparent ethical dimension of the sentence. When the sentence is 
interpreted in a way that renders it nonsensical, any purported ethical insight falls a part 
in our hands; when it is interpreted in a way that renders it senseful, it becomes factive 
and altogether loses its ethical edge.31 This is just as it should be since, for Wittgenstein, 
ethical insights are, by their very nature, not to be expressed in language. It is in this 
respect that:  
 
All propositions are of equal value. (TLP 6.4) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  Sentences also lose any purported ethical edge when they are used to express senseless tautologies 
and contradictions, as I discuss in Tejedor (Forthcoming) op. cit, note 14. 
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Conclusion 
 
We have seen that, for Wittgenstein, having a religious attitude – that is, being in a good 
ethical state – is being conceptually clear. Being clear about certain formal concepts 
(such as those of picture, proposition and thought) is being disposed to treat all facts as 
fundamentally contingent. For this reason, the clarificatory purpose of the Tractatus is its 
ethical purpose: the two are one and the same. In Wittgenstein’s view, if the Tractatus 
succeeds in fulfilling its ethical purpose, it does so in that it enables us to fine-tune our 
practical abilities in the use of signs: it enables us to become clear in our mastery of 
formal concepts.  
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